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ETHNIC OR POLITICAL FRACTIONALISATION? A DISTRICT LEVEL 
ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS IN SRI LANKA 
 
Abstract: 
This study investigates the influence of ethnic and political fractionalisation on the provision 
of public goods at a district level in Sri Lanka. Evidence shows that political fractionalisation 
has a greater negative impact on the provision of public goods compared to ethnic 
fractionalisation. Similarly, political polarisation has a greater negative effect on the 
provision of public goods compared to ethnic polarisation. The interaction between the ethnic 
and political measures suggest that political fractionalisation (political polarisation) 
exacerbates the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization (ethnic polarisation) on the 
provision of public goods. The ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELF) index assumes greater 
statistical significance under fixed effects estimation suggesting greater within district effects 
in the relationship between ELF and public good provision. 
Keywords: ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, political fractionalisation, public goods, Sri 
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1    Introduction 
There has been an extensive literature on the negative effects of ethnic divisions on economic 
outcomes - Easterly and Levine (1997), and Collier (2000) on economic growth; Alesena et 
al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Banerjee et al. (2005), Banerjee and Somanathan 
(2007), Miguel and Gugerty (2004) on public good provision; Canning and Fay (1993), 
Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1999) on government activity and the quality of institutions. 
The general conclusion of these studies has been that ethnic divisions lead to sub-optimal 
economic outcomes due to a lack of consensus among different ethnic groups. There are 
several channels through which ethnic fractionalisation could affect the provision of public 
goods. Banerjee and Somanathan (2008) emphasise political differences; Dincer (2008) 
corruption; Kimenyi (2006) the quality of governance; Easterly and Levine (1997) 
government policies and conflict among ethic groups which can adversely affect the delivery 
of public goods; Alesina et al. (1999) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) different preferences 
with regard to public goods which can lead to lower funds being channelled to public good 
provision; Dincer and Lambert (2012) income inequality which can affect the distribution of 
public goods; and Bobo and Klugel (1993) emphasise competition between different ethnic 
groups for scarce resources.  
 
A related literature questions as to what the best measure is of ethnic divisions. The studies of 
Alesena et al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Banerjee et al. (2005), Banerjee and 
Somanathan use a fractionalization index. The most commonly used fractionalization 
measure is based on the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a population 
come from two different groups. The theoretical maximum is reached at a value of 1 when 
each person belongs to a different group (see Aleseina and la Ferrara 2000, Alesina et al. 
1999). As opposed to this, Esteban and Ray (1994) and Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
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(2002) put forward a measure of polarization according to which a maximum is reached when 
two equally sized groups face each other. The studies of Dincer (2008) and Dincer and 
Lambert (2012) use both measures of heterogeneity. The present study uses both measures in 
an attempt to investigate the effects of heterogeneity on public good provision. 
 
The literature further suggests that political divisions often reflect social divides (Banerjee 
and Somanathan 2008). Collier (2000) observes that political institutions are more important 
in deeply divided societies in comparison to relatively homogenous societies due to the fact 
that high levels of democracy in homogenous societies have the ability to offset the adverse 
effects of high levels of fractionalisation. Aghion et al. (2004) in an analysis of the degree to 
which societies choose to delegate power to their leaders, argue that political systems could 
insulate certain ethnic groups from participating in the political process in more fragmented 
societies. Annett (2001) shows that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization can lead to 
greater political instability to which governments may react, by increasing consumption 
expenditure as a buffer against that political instability. The political science literature 
moreover, shows that ethnic divisions are closely related to the structure of political party 
systems (Horowitz 1993, Mozaffar et al. 2003, Posner 2007). According to this literature, 
electoral institutions can either moderate or strengthen the negative impact of ethnic divisions 
on public outlook towards democratic systems.  
 
Accordingly, the literature suggests that political institutions and ethnic fragmentation are 
inextricably interwoven. Political competition can therefore undermine the provision of 
public goods in an ethnically divided society. The objective of the present study is to 
investigate the influence of ethnic and political divisions on the provision of public goods in 
Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is particularly relevant for a study of this nature because: (1) it has a 
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deeply divided society as reflected by 26 years of civil war between the majority Sinhalese 
and the country’s largest minority group, the Tamils; (2) the political party system appears to 
reflect this ethnic division (see Uyangoda 2010); (3) it has unusually high achievements in 
health and education despite being a low income country. The life expectancy at birth 
currently stands at 74 years; the infant mortality rate is 13 per 1000 live births; and the 
literacy rate is 89 percent (World Development Indicators 2011). Sri Lanka is considered as a 
model of a successful welfare state mainly due to the Sri Lanka government’s commitment to 
the free provision of health services, education, and food subsidies since independence. There 
are however, district level disparities in public good provision, and the present study looks at 
ethnic and political conflict as possible explanations for this. 
 
This is the first study to investigate the influence of ethnic and political divisions on the 
provision of pubic goods in Sri Lanka. The data used in this study is drawn primarily from 
the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka. Data for the census years 1953, 1963, 
1971, 1981, 2001 and the year 2006/2007 covering the 25 districts of Sri Lanka are used. 
Results are tested for robustness in a number of ways. Several additional control variables are 
used to capture a range of possible factors affecting public good provision, an interaction 
term for ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELF) x political fractionalisation is incorporated to 
see if political fractionalisation exacerbates the negative effects of ELF on public good 
provision, the estimation is carried out by replacing the ELF and political fractionalisation 
indices with ethnic polarisation and political polarisation indices, the existence of a non-
linear relationship between the provision of public goods and fractionalisation are also 
investigated (see Dincer 2008). Given the use of district level data, fixed effects estimation is 




The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background to the Sri 
Lankan ethnic and political structure. Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 evaluates the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2   Background 
Sri Lanka is a low middle income nation which ranks high in terms of human development.  
It was first colonised by the Portuguese, then the Dutch and finally the British. The Sinhalese 
make up 73.9% of the population, Tamils 12.7%, Indian Tamils 5.5%1, Moor (Muslim) 7.1%, 
Burgher 0.2%2, Malay 0.3% and other ethnic groups 0.3% (Department of Census and 
Statistics, Population Census 2001). According to historical anecdotes, the Sinhalese-Tamil 
conflict dates back to the period of the kingdoms.  When the Portuguese invaded Sri Lanka in 
1505, the majority of the Tamil people were concentrated in the Northern and Eastern parts of 
the country and the Sinhalese resided in the  in the rest of the country (Singer 1992, DeVotta 
2000). The British followed a divide and rule policy under which they favoured the Tamil 
minority. Therefore at independence, the Tamil community disproportionately held the 
majority of jobs in public service. Independence led to a resurgence of nationalism with calls 
for the need to restore Buddhism and the Sinhala language to their rightful place. This 
culminated in the enactment of the 1956 ‘Sinhala only’ legislation by SWRD Bandaranaike 
of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), according to which Sinhala was established as the 
only official language for administrative purposes. This was aimed at capturing the votes of 
the Sinhala educated community who felt marginalised by the English speaking elites of all 
ethnic groups (International Crisis Group 2007). The disastrous consequences that this had, 
leading to feelings of marginalism by the largest ethnic minority group, the Tamils, resulted 
in a civil conflict which lasted 26 years not at the time, foreseen by Sri Lankan politicians.  
                                                          
1 The Indian Tamil people were brought in by the British colonizers to work on the tea plantations. 
2 Descendants of the Dutch and Portuguese. 
7 
 
Sri Lankan society is divided along race, religion, caste and class lines. Since independence 
Sri Lanka has had a two party system. The conservative United National Party (UNP) formed 
in 1947 and the socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1952, alternating with each 
other for power. Since 1994 however, the two major parties have failed to gain a clear 
majority and have formed coalition governments with smaller parties to come into power. In 
1994 the SLFP came into power by forming a seven-party, leftist coalition called the People's 
Alliance (PA). In 2001 the UNP formed a coalition government with the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress's (SLMC) to take control of parliament. In 2004, the SLFP formed an alliance again 
with several leftist parties to come into power. The North and East have been represented by  
Tamil parties, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Federal Party. Subsequently these two 
parties amalgamated to become the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). With the civil 
war in 1983, the TULF leadership went into exile and a number of Tamil militant groups 
emerged to fill the political vacuum created by the TULF’s exile. Among these militant 
groups that emerged as political parties to work within the arena of provincial councils and 
parliament are, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF), People’s Liberation 
Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP). 
These three parties have been active in parliamentary politics since 1987 (see Uyangoda 
2010). The UNP and SLFP however, have not been able to come to a consensus for power 
sharing with the Tamil community. Instead they are engaged in a process of ‘ethnic 
outbidding’ maintaining to be the better representative of the majority (International Crisis 
Group 2007). Sri Lanka has been characterised by minority coalitions governments headed 
by the UNP and SLFP and the presence of ideologically narrower parties since 1994.  
Coalition governments can undermine the provision of public goods by stalling the 
implementation of legislation required for public goods provision and placing pressure on the 
main governing party.  
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Sri Lanka has 9 provinces and 25 districts in total. The Northern districts - Jaffna, 
Kilinochchi, Mullativu, Mannar and Vavuniya; and the Eastern district, Batticaloa, have a 
Tamil majority, 99.9%, 99.9%, 99.9%, 51.4%, 86.3%, 74% respectively. The Eastern 
districts, Ampara and Trincomalee, have a Moor (Muslim) majority, 41.3% and 45.4% 
respectively; and Nuwara-Eliya has an Indian Tamil majority, 50.6% (Department of Census 
and Statistics Sri Lanka 2001). The rest of the districts have a Sinhalese majority. See Figure 
1 for a district level division of the country. 
[Figure 1, about here] 
 
Ethnic divisions are reflected in the party system, with the Tamil minority in the Northern 
districts being represented primarily by the Tamil parties, and the Sinhalese by the UNP and 
SLFP parties. According to Horowitz (1985), political parties in divided societies which may 
initially reflect ethnic divisions, could contribute to widening the differences between groups  
because politicians may find it in their own interest to make use of these divisions to pursue 
their own agendas.  
 
3   Data and Methodology 
The study covers the census years, 1953, 1963, 1971, 1981, 2001 and the year 2006/07 at the 
district level. Data at the district level is not easily accessible and required going through a 
number of reports primarily from the Department of Census and Statistics. Data for all 
variables for all years were not available. Hence, the choice of variables used in the study is 
severely restricted by the availability of data. See Table 1 for data description and sources.  
 
[Table 1, about here] 
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 The dependent variables in the study include the provision of public goods: (1) government 
schools, (2) government school teachers, (3) government health medical officers, (4) maternal 
mortality rate per 1000 live births, (4) infant mortality rate per 1000 live births used as 
proxies for the provision of public health, (5) water availability of main water service lines 
near household, (6) electricity availability of electricity lines near household and (7) road 
kilometerage.  
 
The main independent variables in the study are the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index 
(ELF) and the political fractionalisation index. The ELF index is calculated as one minus the 
Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares that two people randomly drawn from the 
population are from distinct groups as commonly used in the literature (Alesina et al. 1999, 
Alesina 2004, Banerjee and Somanathan 2007 among others).  






Where iethnic denotes the population share of the i
th  group. Ethnic fractionalisation is  
 
calculated using the ethnic classification of the Department of Census and Statistics which 
divides the population into seven groups: Sinhalese, Tamil, Indian Tamil, Moor (Muslim), 
Burgher, Malay, Other.  
 
 
The other variable of interest is the political fractionalisation index. The political 
fractionalisation index is calculated using the Herfindahl index in the same manner as the 
ELF index (see Banerjee and Somanathan 2007).  The present study employs the number of 
seats held by each party in each district for the calculation of the political fractionalisation 
index rather than the vote share going to each party as in Banerjee and Somanathan (2007). 
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The reason for this is that, if there are no political appointments to parliament from a 
particular party, candidates will not be in a position to provide public goods.  





Where seats i  denote the number of seats held by the i
th  party. Political fractionalisation is  
 
calculated by using the number of seats held in parliament by each party in each district for 
the years under consideration.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the figures for ethnic and political fractionalisation by district for 2006. 
Note that political fractionalisation exceeds ethnic fractionalisation in all districts for which 
data are available with the exception of Trincomalee, Nuwara-Eliya and Batticaloa.  
 
[Figures 2-5, about here] 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the movement of the ELF and political fractionalisation indices over time. 
The Figure shows that the two move very closely together, however, that the political 
fractionalisation index is more volatile compared to the ELF index. The political 
fractionalisation index is higher than the ELF index in all districts with the exception of  
Trincomalee and Nuwera-Eliya. These two districts are the ethnically most fractionalised in 
Sri Lanka. Figures 4 and 5 plot the number of schools and number of medical officers 
respectively against the ELF index. There is a negative relationship between the number of 
schools and ELF index. There does not appear to be a discernible pattern between the ELF 




Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), argue that fractionalization does not necessarily 
increase conflict. They find ethnic polarization to have a significant effect on civil wars. This 
is particularly relevant in the case of Sri Lanka where the main ethnic minority, the Tamil 
minority were engaged in a 26 year old civil war with the ethnic majority, the Sinhalese. The 
estimation is therefore also carried out by replacing the fractionalisation indices with the 
polarisation indices. Estaban and Ray (1994) and Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) 
argue that a country comprising a number of small groups may be more stable as opposed to 

















where is  is the share of group i in the population. The EPI reaches maximum 
 
when two equally sized groups confront each other and falls as the relationship between the 
groups diverges from this half and half divide.  Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) 
show that this index is associated with ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF). A polarisation 
















Where x i  denotes the number of seats held by the i
th  party. Figure 6 illustrates the figures for 
ethnic and political polarisation by district for 2006. Note that as in Figure 2, political 
polarisation exceeds ethnic polarisation in all districts for which data are available with the 
exception of Trincomalee, Nuwara-Eliya and Batticaloa.  Figure 7 illustrates the movement 
of the EPI and political polarisation indices over time. As opposed to the fractionalisation 
indices, the two series tend to diverge a lot more. However, once again, the political 
polarisation index is more volatile compared to the EPI.  
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[Figures 6-7, about here] 
Table 2 presents the distribution of total and per capita public goods across districts. A 
preliminary examination of the data appear to support the hypothesis that greater political 
fractionalisation contributes to the lower provision of public goods. The districts which rank 
highest in terms of political fractionalisation, Trincomalee (0625), Colombo (0.615), 
Gampaha (0.581), Nuwera-Eliya (0.571), and Kalutara (0.540) also appear to have a lower 
number of schools, teachers, road kilometerage and electricity lines per capita. Nuwera-Eliya 
which also has a relatively high degree of ethnic fractionalisation, has a lower number of 
medical officers per capita, and a high maternal mortality rate.  
 
 [Table 2, about here]  
 
Other control variables used in the study are based upon the literature (Alsesina et al. 1999, 
Banerjee and Somanathan 2007). Per capita mean monthly income is used to measure the 
level of development of a district. District size is captured by the population in each district. 
As a more educated population is more likely to choose better policies, the literacy rate for 
each district is used to measure the level of educational attainment of a district. The district 
level provision of public goods may be explained by the inequality in income distribution in 
that district. Therefore the Gini coefficient of % of poor households are used to measure 
income inequality. A dummy variable is introduced for the war affected Northern and Eastern 
districts. This variable takes a value of 1 for the war affected years and zero otherwise.  
 
Dincer (2008) and Dincer and Lambert (2012) find evidence of non-linear effects of ELF on 
corruption and income inequality. In this case, an increase in fractionalisation beyond a 
certain point could reduce the negative effect of ELF on the provision of public goods. In 
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order to capture any non-linear effects that might be present, the model is also estimated with 
a squared term for ELF. Table 3 reports summary statistics for the data used in the estimation.   
[Table 3, about here] 
 
The empirical model takes the following form: 
Dt Dt Dt Dt D DtY ELF PLOLFRAC xα ϑ ϖ β ν ε= + + + + +  
 where DtY represents access to a particular public good in district D in period t. ELFDt 
represents the ethnic fractionalisation index and POLFRACDt the political fractionalisation 
index for district D in period t. Robustness tests are carried out by replacing the ELF index 
with the EPI and the POLFRAC index with a POLPI index. Correlation between the 
fractionalisation and polarisation indices are reported in Table 4. The correlation between the 
ELF and POLFRAC indices and the EPI and the POLPI are low. There is however, a high 
degree of correlation between the ELF and EPI indices, and the POLFRAC and POLPI 
indices. Therefore the fractionalisation indices and the polarisation indices are not used 
together but separately in the estimation that follows.  
[Table 4, about here] 
 
All control variables mentioned in Section 3 are captured by the vector xDt. VD is a dummy 
variable which takes on a value of 1 for the war affected Northern and Eastern districts in the 
war affected years. Banerjee and Somanathan (2008) argue that political heterogeneity could 
reflect social heterogeneity. This suggests that political fractionalisation could further 
exacerbate the negative effects of ethnic fractionalisation. In Sri Lanka, ethnic divisions are 
reflected in the party system. The Northern districts in which there is a Tamil majority, are 
represented mainly by Tamil parties and the Sinhalese mainly by the UNP and the SLFP. 
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There are however, several different Sinhala and Tamil parties which the index of political 
fractionalisation captures which cannot be captured by the measure of ethnic 
fractionalisation. In order to explore the effects of political divides on ethnic divisions, the 
political fractionalization index is also interacted with the ethnic fractionalization index. Dtε  
is a random error term that captures all other variables.  
 
4    Results 
As mentioned above the data cover the years, 1953, 1963, 1971, 1981, 2001 and 2006. The 
preliminary model is estimated using pooled OLS. Fixed effects panel data estimation is used 
additionally, to capture unobserved district specific effects.  
Pooled OLS 
The results for the regression using pooled OLS are reported in Table 5 where the dependent 
variables are: the number of government schools (column 1), government school teachers 
(columns 2), government health medical officers (column 3), the number of maternal deaths 
(column 4), the infant mortality rate (column 5), electricity availability of main electricity 
service lines near household (column 6), water availability of main water service lines near 
household (column 7) and road kilometerage (column 8). The data comprises an unbalanced 
panel. The main independent variables are the ELF index, political fractionalisation index 
(POLFRAC) and the interaction term between ELF and POLFRAC. A number of control 
variables are also included in the model. Population, to control for the size of the district, per 
capita income and the literacy rate to capture the level of development of the district.  As 
pointed out by Alesina et al. (1999), fractionalisation could be a fractionalisation of income 
rather than ethnicity. Therefore the Gini coefficient is used to capture income distribution. A 
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dummy variable is included for the war affected Northern and Eastern districts for the war 
affected years. 
[Table 5, about here] 
The results reported in Table 5 show that ELF has a statistically significant negative effect on 
government school teachers, the availability of electricity, and water lines. A 1 unit increase 
in the ethnic fractionalisation index in column (2) for example, will lead to a 0.4% fall in 
government school teachers. Note that the political fractionalisation index has a much greater 
negative statistically significant impact on the provision of public goods compared to the ELF 
index. A 1 unit increase in the political fractionalisation index leads to a 0.6% fall in 
government school teachers in column (2). Political fractionalisation has a significant 
negative impact on the number of government schools, school teachers, health medical 
officers, the availability of electricity and water lines, and a significant increase in infant 
mortality. The interaction of ELF with the POLFRAC index has a negative impact on the 
same public goods suggesting that political fractionalisation acts to increase the negative 
effects of ethnic fractionalisation.  
 
The statistically significant coefficients on district size as measured by population indicate 
that larger districts have more government schools, teachers, health medical officers and road 
kilometerage. The coefficients on the literacy rate in columns (2) and (3) are statistically 
significant implying that more literate districts are more likely to have more school teachers 
and medical officers. The estimates on the Gini coefficients indicate that school teachers and 
medical officers are higher in districts in which there is greater inequality, and the supply of 
electricity is lower in districts characterised by greater inequality. Per capita income is 
statistically significant in all columns with the exception of column (2). The dummy variables 
on the Northern and Eastern districts are negative and significant in all columns with the 
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exception of columns (4) and (8) suggesting that the war had a negative impact on the 
provision of public goods in these two regions. 
[Table 6, about here] 
Alesena et al. (1999) observe that the share of ethnic minorities could be strongly correlated 
to the ELF index so that the ELF index could be proxying for the share of minority groups. If 
the ethnic minority groups were proxying for the ELF index, or alternatively the political 
fractionalisation index, then these indices would cease to be statistically significant with the 
inclusion of ethnic minority groups in the estimation. Hence, in order to investigate if the 
ELF or political fractionalisation index are proxying for ethnic minority groups, the % of  
Tamil, Indian Tamil and Moors are included in the estimation in Table 6. In Table 5, the ELF 
index was statistically significant in columns (2), (6) and (7). The ELF index gains greater 
statistical significance in Table 6, showing that an increase in ELF leads to a fall in 
government schools, teachers, health medical officers, electricity and water availability. The 
political fractionalisation index continues to be statistically significant with respect to the 
same variables as before. It can be concluded that the percentage of ethnic minority groups 
are not proxying for the ELF index, as the ELF gains greater significance rather than losing 
statistical significance with the incorporation of the % of minority groups. Once again, 
political fractionalisation has a larger negative statistically significant impact on the provision 
of public services compared to the ELF index. The interaction of the ELF*POLFRAC has a 
negative significant impact on the provision of public schools, school teachers, medical 
officers, water, electricity supply and on the maternal and infant mortality rates. The 
coefficient on Tamil is negative and statistically significant, in columns (1), (4), (6) and (8), 
suggesting that the number of government schools, electricity availability and road 
connections to other cities are lower if Tamil. For Indian Tamil community, government 
teachers, health medical officers, electricity, water availability and road connections are 
17 
 
lower, and for the Muslim community, health medical officers and electricity availability are 
lower and maternal deaths are also lower. 
 
The coefficient on population has a statistically significant positive effect on schools, school 
teachers, medical officers, maternal deaths and road kilometerage. Larger districts as 
measured by population have more schools, school teachers, medical officers and are better 
connected to other cities. They also have a larger number of maternal deaths. The coefficients 
on the literacy rate in columns (1)-(4) are statistically significant suggesting that more literate 
districts are more likely to have more schools, school teachers, medical officers and fewer 
maternal deaths. The estimates on the Gini coefficient are statistically significant in columns 
(1), (2), (4) and (6). The provision of schools and school teachers are higher and the supply of 
water lower the greater the inequality. Maternal deaths are higher the greater the inequality. 
Per capita income is not statistically significant. The dummy variables for the Northern and 
Eastern districts are negative in columns (1), (2), (5)-(7) suggesting that the provision of 
schools, teachers, electricity and water were lower in these areas in the war affected years and 
infant deaths were higher. 
 
Additional control variables which included, population density, the % of urban and rural 
population and land ownership were also explored with. The coefficients on population 
density, the higher the provision of public goods. The coefficients on land ownership and  
urban-rural population were not statistically significant. 
 
Table 7 reports results for non-linearity effects in ELF. The ELF index is statistically 
significant in columns (2), (6) and (7) . The political fractionalisation index continues to be 
statistically significant in all columns except for columns (4) and (8). The squared term on the 
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ELF index is statistically significant at the 10% level only in the case of health medical 
officers. There is in general, no evidence of non-linear effects of ELF on the provision of 
public goods.  
 [Tables 7-8, about here] 
Table 8 replicates the estimation carried out in Table 5, replacing the ELF index with the EPI 
and the political fractionalisation index with a political polarisation index. The coefficients on 
the EPI are statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1) and (3) indicating a 
negative effect on government school and health medical officers. The political polarisation 
index assumes greater statistical significance compared to the ethnic EPI as with the political 
fractionalisation index. The interaction terms between the EPI and political polarisation index 
is statistically significant in all columns with the exception of column (4) suggesting that 
political polarisation magnifies the effects of ethnic polarisation having an adverse effect on 
public good provision. 
 
Fixed Effects Estimation 
Next fixed effects estimation is carried out to account for district level time invariant 
unobservable influences on the provision of public goods. The fixed effects estimation is 
replicated on the estimation in Table 5. The results are reported in Table 9.  
[Table 9, about here] 
The fixed effects estimation yields better results with the coefficient on the ELF index 
assuming statistical significance in columns (1), (2), (5), (6), (7) and (8), suggesting greater 
within district effects in the relation between ELF and public good provision. Greater ELF 
leads to a lower provision of schools, teachers, electricity and water, and higher infant 
mortality. Increased political fractionalisation leads to a lower supply of schools, teachers, 
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health medical officers, electricity, water and higher infant mortality rates. Larger districts as 
measured by population are better off with respect to schools, teachers, medical officers, and 
electricity. Per capita income is statistically significant in all columns except (3) and (7) 
suggesting that higher income leads to increased schools, school teachers, electricity and road 
kilometerage and lower maternal and infant mortality.  
 
5   Conclusions 
This study investigates the effect of ELF and political fractionalisation on the provision of 
public goods in Sri Lanka. The impact of ethnic polarization and political polarisation on 
public good provision are also examined. The political fractionalisation and political 
polarisation indices have a greater adverse effect on the provision of public goods compared 
to the ELF and EPI. While the political fractionalisation index has a consistently negative 
effect on public good provision under all three estimation methods, the ELF index assumes 
greater statistical significance under fixed-effects estimation. The results suggest that the 
relationship between ELF and public good provision is stronger within given districts 
suggesting the importance of district specific effects in the relation between ELF and public 
good provision3. While the results are consistent with the previous literature (for example, 
Alesena et al. 1999, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, Banerjee et al. 2005, Banerjee and 
Somanathan 2007), the present study offers a new dimension to the existing literature with 
regard to interpretation. The results also suggest that ethnic and political fractionalisation 
cannot be considered in isolation of one another. Since 1994, the two main political parties in 
                                                          
3 This is supported by Forbes (2000) who finds that when country effects are incorporated into a pooled OLS 
model, the relationship between inequality and growth becomes positive and significant suggesting the 





Sri Lanka have had to accommodate the needs of a number of smaller less moderate parties 
which may have potentially slowed down the provision of public goods in particular districts. 
Therefore policymakers should consider the problems arising from fractionalised (or 
polarised) party systems in their attempts to achieve sustainable growth. With the cessation of 
the war in 2009, Sri Lanka now faces the task of achieving a sustainable growth rate. While 
Sri Lanka is regarded as a model of a welfare state, it can be argued that public service 
provision can be enhanced to a greater degree, particularly districts in which political and 
social divides are high, if the two main political parties in consultation with other parties, are 
able to reach common ground concerning successful democratization. This would depend to a 
large degree upon the construction of institutions that promote the rule of law and restrain the 
concentration of power. “The design of these institutions needs to be based on a realistic 
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Table 1: Description of Variables used in the Study and Data Sources 
Data Source 
Public Goods:  
   Number of government schools Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstracts, various 
issues. 
   Number of government school  
   teachers 
Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstracts, various 
issues. 
   Maternal mortality rate per 1000  
   live births  (used as proxy for 
   provision of public health 
   health)  
Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstracts, various 
issues. 
 
   Infant mortality rate per 1000  
   live births  (used as proxy for 
   provision of public health 
   health)  
Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstracts, various 
issues. 
 
   Public health medical officers Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri 
Lanka, various issues 
  Water availability of main water  
  service line near household 
Department of Census and Statistics, Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys. 
  Electricity availability of electricity 
   line near household 
Department of Census and Statistics, Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys. 
  Road  kilometerage Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri 
Lanka, various issues. 
Ethnic fractionalisation authors own 
calculation using   % of each ethnic 
group as classified by the Department of 
Census and Statistics. 
Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstracts, various 
issues. 
Data for ethnicity Northern province 2006/2007 from Northern 
District reports. 
Political fractionalisation authors own 
calculation based on the number of seats  
secured by each party in each district 
Department of Election Sri Lanka, results of parliamentary general 
elections. 
 
Ethnic polarization authors own 
calculation using proportion of each 
ethnic group as classified by the 
Department of Census and Statistics. 
Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstracts, various 
issues. 
Data for ethnicity Northern province 2006/2007 from Northern 
District reports. 
Political polarisation authors own 
calculation based on the number of seats  
secured by each party in each district 
Department of Election Sri Lanka, results of parliamentary general 
elections. 
 
Per capita mean monthly income Department of Census and Statistics, Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys. 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey for Northern and 
Eastern Province 2002/2003. 
Literacy rate Department of Census and Statistics Statistical Abstracts, various 
issues. 
Income inequality – Gini coefficient of 
per capita income 
Department of Census and Statistics, Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys 
Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999/2000. 
 

















































Colombo 410 0.17 14985 6.10 3145 1.28 0.03 
Gampaha 537 0.25 14010 6.55 1160 0.54 0.07 
Kalutara 406 0.37 9670 8.70 480 0.43 0.19 
Kandy 643 0.47 15318 11.10 1197 0.87 0.1 
Matale 307 0.64 5365 11.25 237 0.50 0.43 
Nuwera-Eliya 517 0.70 6180 8.33 172 0.23 0.61 
Galle 422 0.40 10850 10.31 794 0.75 0.15 
Matara 363 0.45 9539 11.73 350 0.43 0.34 
Hambantota 308 0.56 6859 12.43 184 0.33 0.13 
Jaffna 410 0.68 5746 9.59 246 0.41 0.32 
Vavuniya 188 1.13 1806 10.88 77 0.46 0.25 
Mullativu 103 0.70 987 6.71 - - 0.42 
Kilinochchi 96 0.66 - - - - 0.93 
Batticaloa 323 0.62 4250 8.13 252 0.48 0.15 
Ampara 390 0.63 6541 10.64 180 0.29 0.31 
Trincomalee 258 0.73 3935 11.08 186 0.52 0.37 
Kurunegala 881 0.58 18555 12.18 587 0.39 0.08 
Puttlam 340 0.45 6253 8.32 247 0.33 0.08 
Anuradhapura 550 0.69 9175 11.45 311 0.39 0.12 
Polonnaruwa 232 0.59 3467 8.78 174 0.44 0.14 
Badulla 569 0.67 9788 11.52 388 0.46 0.34 
Moneragala 262 0.62 4632 10.90 187 0.44 0.14 
Ratnapura 579 0.53 10399 9.58 335 0.31 0.33 





















































Colombo 15.0 823 0.34 89.4 0.04 99.8 0.04 
Gampaha 6.1 1614 0.75 45.7 0.02 99.4 0.05 
Kalutara 4.1 1068 0.96 36.8 0.03 94.1 0.08 
Kandy 15.4 2011 1.46 61.0 0.04 94.7 0.07 
Matale 10.3 853 1.79 41.9 0.09 86.8 0.18 
Nuwera-Eliya 15.6 1103 1.49 64.1 0.09 91.1 0.12 
Galle 10.8 1150 1.09 33.5 0.03 92.7 0.09 
Matara 8.4 934 1.15 46.2 0.06 95.1 0.12 
Hambantota 6.7 1073 1.94 75.2 0.14 89.7 0.16 
Jaffna 5.7 1230 2.05 - - - - 
Vavuniya 8.0 604 3.64 - - - - 
Mullativu 2.5 567 3.86 - - - - 
Kilinochchi 1.2 281 1.92 - - - - 
Batticaloa 21.1 652 1.25 17.0 0.03 93.1 0.18 
Ampara 5.9 738 1.20 26.1 0.04 85.4 0.14 
Trincomalee 3.4 856 2.41 
    Kurunegala 14.2 2345 1.54 13.7 0.01 84.2 0.06 
Puttlam 6.4 1127 1.50 45.5 0.06 82.5 0.11 
Anuradhapura 17.4 2215 2.77 32.7 0.04 84.9 0.11 
Polonnaruwa 27.6 926 2.34 38.5 0.10 88 0.22 
Badulla 9.5 1877 2.21 77.2 0.09 89 0.10 
Moneragala 2.1 1023 2.41 43.8 0.10 78.8 0.19 
Ratnapura 13 1836 1.69 52.8 0.05 78.6 0.07 










Table 3: Summary Statistics for Full Sample 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ELF Index 130 0.322 0.199 0.001 0.694 
Tamil % 130 19.13 30.28 0.3 99.95 
Moor % 130 9.90 11.80 0.04 49.80 
Indian Tamil % 125 7,93 12.97 0.00 59.20 
Political Fractionalisation 
Index 
101 0.416 0.231 0.00 0.777 
Ethnic Polarisation Index 126 0.513 0.021 0.002 0.927 
Political Polarisation 
Index 
101 0.708 0.343 0 1.00 
Government Schools 
(number) 
104 393.89 215.81 74 1074 
Government School 
Teachers (number) 




80 428.40 582.23 20 3145 
Maternal Deaths (per 
1000 live births) 
118 0.88 0.85 0.03 3.70 
Infant Mortality (per 
1000 live births) 
120 26.45 19.26 1.2 100 
Electricity (Availability 
of electricity lines near 
household) 
72 82.67 8.85 63 100 
Water (Availability of 
water lines near 
household) 
72 40.47 19.44 7 89.4 
Road Kilometerage 91 1104.69 527.09 267 2500 
Population (‘000) 137 619.35 510.99 35.1 2672.3 
Mean Per Capita Income 
(Rupees) 
68 3154.72 2113.57 800 10,165 
Literacy Rate 72 87.08 5.10 75 96.3 




Table 4: Correlation between the Fractionalisation and Polarisation Indices 
 
ELF POLFRAC EPI POLPI 
ELF 1.00 - - - 
POLFRAC 0.107 1.00 - - 
EPI 0.977 0.131 1.00 - 





Table 5: Pooled OLS  
 Dependent Variables 




















































































































































































R2 0.81 0.96 0.91 0.28 0.22 0.77 0.46 0.51 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 













Table 6: Pooled OLS Including Percentage of Race 
 Dependent Variables 


























































































































































































































R2 0.80 0.91 0.90 0.51 0.33 0.85 0.70 0.80 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 












Table 7: Testing for Non-linear Effects 
 
 Dependent Variables 













































































R2 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 
Observations 65 65 67 73 73 61 61 66 


















Table 8: Using the Polarization Indices 
 
 Dependent Variables 






























































































































































































R2 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.56 0.59 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 




















Table 9: Panel Fixed Effects Estimation with Additional Control Variables 
 Dependent Variables 





















































































































































































R2 0.41 0.46 0.52 0.33 0.26 0.51 0.26 0.34 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Note: Robust standard errors  reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels   
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
